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BENEFICIARIES IN A DECEDENT'S ESTATE: 
AN EXAMINATION OF THE LAWS OF NEW YORK, 
NEW JERSEY AND CONNECTICUT 
by 
Elizabeth A. Marcuccio* and Albert B. Kukol** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
"A man must be just before he is generous." 1 
This ancient equitable maxim comes to mind when examining 
the rights that creditors have in a decedent's estate. Probate 
assets of a decedent-debtor are generally available to creditors. 
Probate systems developed to gather the decedent's assets, pay 
creditors' claims out of these assets, and distribute what is left 
to the designated beneficiaries. This system is in alignment 
with one of society's important policies: creditors should be 
paid. However, this policy sometimes conflicts with an equally 
important policy: the right of decedents to dispose of their 
property as they see fit. The purpose of this article is to 
examine the laws ofNew York, New Jersey and Connecticut to 
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determine what rights creditors have in the assets of a decedent 
who died a resident of one of these states. 
The laws of these three northeastern states make it clear 
that both the real and personal property of a decedent, if subject 
to probate, is chargeable with the payment of the decedent's 
debts.2 However, more and more people are opting out of the 
probate system to avoid the delays and expenses of probate 
administration. Creditors need to be aware of this shift and, 
more important, know what non-probate assets are available to 
pay their claims. 
II. JOINT ACCOUNTS 
Jointly-held stocks, bonds, mutual funds, and bank 
accounts are very common, and are established for a variety of 
reasons. When a deposit of cash, securities or other property is 
made in the name of a depositor and another person in a joint 
account, it is presumed that the depositor intends to establish a 
joint tenancy with survivorship rights.3 So when a father opens 
a joint account in his name and the name of his daughter, it is 
prima facie evidence that he intends that his daughter have 
survivorship rights in that account.4 But to what extent is this 
account available for the payment of creditors after the father 's 
death? 
The test used by New York Courts to determine 
creditors' access to non-probate assets is whether the decedent 
maintained the power to dispose of the asset during his 
lifetime.5 In New York, the daughter receives a gift of a 
d . 6 moiety, or one-half, of the value of the property on epos1t. 
Although one-half of the value of the account is considered 
"vested" in the daughter, or gifted to her, at the time the 
account is opened, the other moiety clearly remains the father's 
property and is subject to attachment by his creditors during his 
3 I Vol. 17 I Northeast Journal of Legal Studies 
lifetime. The father is regarded as its absolute owner until he 
dies because he had unrestricted power to dispose of his moiety 
during his lifetime. This allows creditors to reach his one-half 
interest in the joint account after his death, even though he had 
named his daughter to succeed to his interest.7 
Under certain circumstances, creditors of a New York 
decedent can reach the entire balance of a joint account. This 
would be the case if the father opened the joint account solely 
to give his daughter easier access to the funds. If there is clear 
and convincing evidence that the father did not intend to make 
a gift to his daughter, but added her as a signatory for his own 
convenience, the opening of a joint account does not affect 
title, and the entire account is available to creditors.8 The total 
account can also be reached if our depositor was rendered 
insolvent either when he initially opened the joint account with 
his daughter, or if upon his death his estate was ultimately 
rendered insolvent by the establishment of the joint account.9 
Any creditor having a claim against the father's estate can 
maintain an action to set aside the conveyance as fraudulent, 
regardless of whether or not the father actually intended to 
defraud his creditors. 10 
Would the result be different for creditors of a 
decedent domiciled in either New Jersey or Connecticut? In 
New Jersey, when a father opens a joint account in his name 
and the name of his daughter, the inter vivos rights of the 
parties are not affected. 11 The father can insist that the account 
remain his sole property during his lifetime, and that his 
purpose in opening the account was only to achieve a gift to his 
daughter upon his death. The father's right to control the entire 
account makes the total account available to the father's 
creditors both during his lifetime and upon his death, whether 
or not he actually retains control over the account. 12 
2007 I The Conflicting Rights of Creditors I 4 
In Connecticut, statutory law requires a surv1vmg 
account owner to pay from a joint account the following claims 
against the deceased account owner's estate: funeral expenses, 
expenses of settling the estate, debts owed for the last illness of 
the decedent, and any debt due to the state of Connecticut for 
the aid and care of the decedent. 13 Connecticut case law further 
expands creditors' rights in joint accounts. Co-holders of a 
joint account are considered owners of the total account and 
have access to the entire account balance. 14 When a father adds 
his daughter's name as a joint owner to his account, either the 
father or daughter can withdraw all of the funds. 15 As a result, 
Connecticut Courts have ruled that the entire account is 
available for the payment of any valid claim against the father, 
either during his lifetime or upon his death. 16 
III. TOTTEN TRUST ACCOUNTS 
When a father opens a savings account "in trust" for 
his daughter, there really is no trust, but merely a bank account 
that is payable to the daughter upon the father's death. A 
tentative trust exists that is revocable at the will of the father 
until he dies or completes the gift during his lifetime. There is 
only a presumption that an absolute trust will arise in favor of 
the daughter upon the father's death. As a result, in all three 
states when probate assets of the father are insufficient to pay 
his valid debts, the presumption is rebutted to the extent 
necessary to make up the deficiency. 17 The estate 
representative has the authority, and maybe even the duty, to 
set aside Totten trust accounts to the extent necessary to protect 
creditors when probate assets are insufficient to pay their 
I . 18 c atms. 
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IV. U.S. SAVINGS BONDS 
Let's turn to the situation where the father purchases 
a U.S. savings bond and designates his daughter as either the 
co-owner or beneficiary of the bond. Can the father's creditors 
look to the bond for payment of their claims? The passage of 
title to U.S. savings bonds is governed by the regulations of the 
Treasury Department, and not by the rules of property law of 
the individual states. 19 Therefore, the result would be the same 
whether the father died a resident ofNew York, New Jersey or 
Connecticut. Even if the father's probate assets are insufficient 
to pay his obligations, the bond may not be used to pay the 
father's creditors.20 The estate representative is entitled to 
recover from the daughter only the ratable amount of estate tax 
imposed as a result of the bond being included in the father's 
taxable estate. 21 The creditors of this insolvent probate estate 
can look to the savings bond for payment only if the father 
purchased the bond with the actual intent to defraud his 
creditors.22 Actual fraud cannot be presumed, it must be 
proven.23 
V. LIFE INSURANCE 
The primary purpose of life insurance is to protect the 
dependent beneficiaries of an insured by providing them with 
funds to live on after the insured's death. The insurance laws 
in New York, New Jersey and Connecticut clearly recognize 
this purpose, even though life insurance is purchased for many 
different reasons. 24 If a father names his daughter as the 
beneficiary of the death benefit payable under his life insurance 
policy, these proceeds are generally exemEt from the claims of 
the father's creditors in all three states. 5 Only if the father 
intends to defraud his creditors can his creditors reach these 
proceeds. In New York, the father must actually intend to 
defraud his creditors at the time he names his daughter as the 
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beneficiary.26 Under New Jersey law, the daughter is entitled 
to the proceeds against all creditors, but she is not entitled to 
the amount of premiums her father paid with the intent to 
defraud his creditors.27 Pursuant to Connecticut law, the 
daughter is entitled to the proceeds unless her father intended 
to defraud his creditors either when he purchased the policy, or 
when he named her as beneficiary.28 What if the father does 
not want the death benefit paid directly to his daughter, but 
instead wants these proceeds to be poured into a testamentary 
trust established for her benefit? 
In all three states, whether or not the father's creditors 
can attach these proceeds depends on the specific language 
used by the father on the beneficiary designation form. If the 
father names " ... my estate ... " as the beneficiary, the proceeds 
are treated like any other probate asset, and are available to pay 
his creditors' claims.29 However, in all three states ifthe father 
names " .. . the Trustee of the trust established under Article X 
of my Last Will and Testament ... " as the beneficiary, these 
proceeds remain exempt from the claims of the father's 
creditors to the same extent as if the proceeds were payable 
directly to his daughter.30 In the alternative, what if the father 
names the trustee of an inter vivos trust? In all three states, the 
proceeds remain exempt from the claims of the father's 
creditors, but in New York there is one very important 
exception. 
When the father names the trustee of his testamentary 
trust as the beneficiary, it does not matter whether the will 
containing the trust is executed before or after this designation 
is made.31 However, if the beneficiary is the trustee of an inter 
vivos trust, the trust agreement naming the trustee must be in 
existence on the date that the beneficiary designation is made 
and the trust agreement must be identified in the designation.32 
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Otherwise, the proceeds are available to pay the creditors of 
this New York decedent.33 
VI. RETIREMENT PLANS (ERISA COVERED PLANS) 
Many employers provide retirement and death benefit 
plans for their employees. Additionally, many employees who 
do not have employer-provided plans, as well as self-employed 
individuals, set up their own retirement accounts. The 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) is the 
federal law governing most employer sponsored plans.34 
ERISA supersedes all state laws that "relate to any employee 
benefit plan" governed by ERISA in an effort to provide 
protection to employees. 35 
The primary purpose of a pension is to ensure that the 
retired employee will have enough money to live on, free from 
creditors ' claims. Under ERISA, retirement plans must have 
an "anti-alienation" clause, prohibiting assignment of the 
interest under the plan.36 This makes it clear that these plans 
are protected from creditors while in the hands of the plan 
administrator, but are the monies protected once they are paid 
out to the beneficiary? 
Let's assume that a retired father names his daughter 
as the beneficiary of his pension plan. During his lifetime the 
father receives periodic payments from this plan. It is clear 
that once these funds reach his hands, they are subject to 
attachment by his creditors.37 Both New York and New Jersey 
courts have specifically looked at ERISA covered plans, 
holding that ERISA's anti-alienation clause protects funds 
while in the pension plan, but permits attachment once received 
by the pensioner.38 
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But can the father's creditors reach the ERISA 
pension plan proceeds upon his death? What is the status of 
the benefits when paid to the daughter, since the father 
designated her as the third-party beneficiary of the plan 
benefits? As of yet, there is no case which specifically 
addresses this issue. One can argue that since the plan benefits, 
when paid to the father, would be available to his creditors, 
such should be the result here. But should the result be the 
same when paid to a beneficiary who is not the judgment 
debtor, like the daughter in our example? 
VII. RETIREMENT PLANS (NON-ERISA COVERED 
PLANS AND ACCOUNTS) 
While ERISA covers many employer sponsored 
plans, many similar pension plans and retirement accounts fall 
outside of ERISA, such as Individual Retirement Accounts 
("IRAs"), Roth IRAs, 403b plans, and state and local 
government pension plans. Assume that the father had an IRA, 
again naming the daughter as his beneficiary. Since the IRA is 
not protected from creditors by ERISA, is there state law which 
steps in to do the same job? Is the IRA exempted from the 
claims of the father's creditors? How does each state treat 
these non-ERISA retirement plans and accounts after the 
father's death? 
In New York, the IRA is exempt from the claims of 
the father's creditors during his lifetime.39 It has also been 
held to be exempt from the claims of his creditors after his 
death, upon the subsequent payment to his daughter as named 
beneficiary. 40 It does not matter that the father retained all 
incidents of ownership and could change the beneficiary at any 
time during his life. The daughter is entitled to the proceeds. 
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Thus, in New York, even when ERISA does not apply 
to certain retirement plans, either statute or case law exempts 
virtually every type of retirement plan from claims of the 
decedent's creditors.41 New York State employees' retirement 
plans, New York State teachers' retirement plans, Individual 
Retirement Accounts, Federal Thrift Savings Plans, and 403(b) 
retirement annuities are all exempt from the claims of the 
employee's creditors after the employee's death.42 In addition, 
because the Federal Thrift Savings Plan is similar to 40lk plans 
offered by private employers, there is no logical reason why 
40lk plans should not be protected from creditor claims after 
the employee's death. 43 
What if the father had conveyed assets into his 
retirement plan with the intent to defraud his creditors? Can 
his creditors reach the plan benefits when they pass to his 
daughter upon his death? In New York, EPTL 7-3.l(b) allows 
creditors to reach fraudulent conveyances into such accounts.44 
Those assets of the account tainted by fraud are no longer 
exempt from creditors' claims. Creditors can look to these 
assets for payment when they pass to the daughter upon the 
father's death.45 
What if the father is a resident of Connecticut or New 
Jersey? What is the status of non-ERISA accounts and plans in 
those states? In both states, statutory and case law similarly 
exempt non-ERISA accounts and plans from creditors' claims 
during the father's lifetime.46 In addition, New Jersey, like 
New York, allows creditors to attach an IRA that was 
d 47 fraudulently create . 
Neither Connecticut nor New Jersey Courts have 
addressed the issue of whether non-ERISA accounts are 
exempt when paid to a daughter who was named as the 
deceased father's beneficiary. While their statutes and their 
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courts' legal analysis are similar to New York's when reviewing 
such non-ERISA accounts prior to the father's death, it remains 
to be seen whether this analysis will carry through after the 
father's death. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Probate avoidance has increased dramatically in 
recent years, and the law concerning creditors' rights in 
nonprobate assets remains fragmented and underdeveloped.48 
Creditors' claims will continue to be examined on a case by 
case basis because there is no comprehensive statute setting 
forth the rights of creditors in nonprobate assets. 
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